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Abstract 
 
We consider the likely economic impact and prospects for monetary integra-
tion among Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine as 
part of the Single Economic Space they have agreed to set up. A monetary 
union among these countries poses three interesting issues for the structure 
and process of integration: they have already been members of a wider cur-
rency union that collapsed, so it is necessary to handle the problems of his-
tory; secondly the union would be of very unequal size with the Russian 
Federation outweighing the others taken together, so we must consider how 
the national interests would be balanced; lastly natural resources, particu-
larly oil and gas pose problems for dependence and for the determination of 
the external exchange rate.  
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After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, eleven of the former constituent republics immediately 
established the Commonwealth of Independent States – the CIS – with a 12
th former republic join-
ing slightly later, while Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania went their way and became members of the 
European Union, and are hoping to join the euro area shortly. Succinctly, the CIS has been handling 
the disintegration and integration between the members, covering in principle a vast range of areas 
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  1and issues over time. As a step of market integration, eleven CIS countries concluded a regional 
free trade agreement in 1994, although the regional free trade area (for goods) set up became partly 
confused by the emergence of some 30 bilateral free trade agreements between the CIS countries in 
the course of the 1990s. In addition, three countries signed an agreement in 1995 with the aim of 
creating a customs union (now increased to six, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan being the other two 
members and labelled the Euro-Asian Economic Community).  
 
In 2003, four CIS countries (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan) established the Single Eco-
nomic Space in principle. This involves the forming of a single market, including an objective of 
creating a monetary union. As this is an agreement in principle, the details of what would constitute 
a ‘single market’ are not spelt out and it is not clear that all the signatories have the same interpreta-
tion of it (Sushko, 2004). Since then, Kazakhstan has at times expressed rather strong hesitation 
about staying in the enterprise, while the position of Ukraine has changed to virtual rejection of the 
idea especially since the election of President Yushchenko at the beginning of 2005. Belarus on the 
other hand has developed a clear agreement in principle for monetary union with the Russian Fed-
eration, whose date for completion is reviewed annually. The Union State Treaty of 1999 gave 
January 1, 2008 as the date (Gulde et al., 2004). Progress seems to have stalled at present because of 
the difficulty in finding a balance between the recognition of the sovereign rights they each have as 
independent countries and the economic dominance of the Russian Federation in practice. Indeed, 
in January 2007, after this paper was completed, a dispute arose with Russia trying to press Belarus, 
to join the Federation, Gazprom doubling prices and Belarus imposing a transit tax to compensate. 
After a brief stop in shipments Belarus withdrew the tax and negotiations are set to resume. At pre-
sent each of the four countries has its own currency and is practising a form of exchange rate target-
ing that is resulting in relatively stable nominal exchange rates. Although Ukraine has introduced 
more flexibility and expressed a longer term wish to move to inflation targeting IMF (2005b). 
 
The situation has changed dramatically since the Russian crisis and default in 1998. Inflation is un-
der control in all countries, although the position in Belarus is fragile exacerbated by the current 
dispute with the Russian Federation, and economic growth is strong. It is not clear how much of this 
is a recovery from an unusually depressed state and how much an improved growth path that will 
continue. Coupled with the trauma of the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union it is very 
difficult to find a basis in data that is very relevant for assessing the prospects for a sustainable 
monetary union. Not only that but the usual problem applies that it is necessary to take account of 
the Lucas critique and ask how, in the event of membership, would behaviour change to meet those 
new circumstances (Frankel and Rose, 1998; De Grauwe and Mongelli, 2005). This is perhaps the 
only area where the major disruptions of the last few years might provide useful data as they do at 
  2least show how the countries have responded to major regime change, economically, politically and 
socially. 
 
II   The Context for Monetary Union 
 
There are two questions that need to be addressed in assessing the economic context for monetary 
union. The first is whether the loss of the nominal exchange rate as an adjustment mechanism is 
likely to impose significant costs on a country. These derive from a combination of whether the 
country is likely to be exposed to different shocks from the union as a whole, to which monetary 
policy responds and the way in which the country is likely to respond to shocks when inside the un-
ion. The second is the extent of the possible gains from integration. This is all forward-looking. 
While the OCA and related criteria, such as the convergence criteria laid down in the Maastricht 
Treaty for membership of the euro area, are helpful guides to spelling out the detail of what this 
may involve they tend to be backward-looking (Schelkle, 2001). Experience in the EU (Hughes-
Hallett and Richter, 2006) suggests that this tends to underestimate the degree of future conver-
gence and reduction in the asymmetry of shocks in behaviour and their impact. In this assessment of 
the suitability of the four CIS countries for monetary union on the basis of their existing characteris-
tics, it may be helpful to compare them to both the OCA and Maastricht criteria.  
 
There is no single accepted list of the OCA criteria following Mundell’s (1961) exposition and 
views of their nature and impact have evolved considerably (Grubel, 2005). We therefore follow the 
list of 10 criteria set out by Edwards (2006), as this is one of the broader and most recent considera-
tions. This does not imply support for any particular list.  
 
Optimal Currency Area Criteria (Edwards, 2006) 
 
–  Factor mobility, particularly labour, across the union 
–  High level of trade across the union 
–  Different/diversified composition of output and trade across countries 
–  Price and wage flexibility across members of the union 
–  Similar inflation rates across countries 
–  Financial markets integrated across countries 
–  No ‘fiscal dominance’ in the individual countries 
–  Low and similar levels of public debt in the different countries 
–  Countries exposed to similar or synchronised external shocks 
–  Political co-ordination across countries 
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However, these criteria are only a guide. They are not of equal importance and forming an overall 
assessment involves a rather arbitrary aggregation. Their applicability also depends on what the out-
side option is. The scope for further gain may be small if much of the ingredients of a union are al-
ready in place (as for countries such as Estonia that are operating a long-standing currency board 
backed by the euro inside the EU). The likelihood of any such union taking place or being sustained 
is much more a political concern and we address that in a later section of the paper. Here we simply 
run through the economic characteristics of the four countries in this context. In particular, we do 
not attempt to replicate the helpful analysis in Chaplygin et al. (2006), which concentrates on the 
asymmetry of structure and shocks among the four countries 
 
The most obvious issue is disparity in size. The Russian Federation is not only twice as large as its 
prospective partners in terms of population (145 million compared to 75 million – Belarus 10, Ka-
zakhstan, 17, Ukraine, 48) but it has a much higher GDP per head (Figure 1), nearly double that of 
Belarus and getting on for three times that of Ukraine, if we take US dollar nominal values, and 40 
to 50% higher even if we consider GDP per capita based on purchasing-power-parity. Kazakhstan is 
growing more rapidly (Figure 2) so the gap is closing. Despite the fact that the Russian Federation 
itself has been growing by over six percent a year recently, the other countries have been outper-
forming it, with the exception of Ukraine in 2005. Thus the relationship among the partners will be 
rather different from that in a modern currency union and would be somewhat more akin to early 
colonial currency unions, where the home country was dominant. Indeed in many respects it would 
be similar to rubleisation with an agreement to share seignorage. Given the lack of wish to recreate 
history, clearly a new union would have to be rather more sensitive to the position of the smaller 
countries as independent sovereign entities, which may not be likely. 
 
Some other economic indicators show greater convergence. Inflation in Kazakhstan (Figure 3) has 
been relatively low despite economic growth of around 10 percent a year, assisted by its role as an 
oil producer. Performance in Ukraine has been worsening somewhat, while Belarus has seen a suc-
cessful reduction from very high levels and is hoping to reach single figures. However, it is worth 
noting how this last adjustment has been achieved (Figure 4) as Belarus has been managing its real 
exchange rate over the period and thereby seeing a substantial but smooth nominal adjustment with 
respect to both its potential partners and with respect to the US dollar. Since the other countries 
have in effect been managing their exchange rates, mainly with respect to the US dollar, they have 
not moved markedly with respect to each other. Nevertheless, inflation in the region was still above 
  410 percent in 2005 and substantial macro-economic adjustment would be required to bring it to the 
levels prevailing in many of the other European transition economies. 
 
Taken together therefore these factors give a relatively favourable outlook on nominal convergence 
if the countries continue to move in the same relative directions, provided that the adverse move-
ment of Ukraine is temporary and the countries, Belarus in particular, do indeed get inflation down, 
although the fact that the share of administered prices in the countries varies considerably (from 
around zero in CPI in Kazakhstan to 13% in Russia and 27% Belarus according to EBRD (2005)) 
which could bring complications to the convergence path. However, while the consequences of a 
real appreciation under a fixed nominal exchange rate might be very unpleasant for Belarus, it 
might be a practical way of bringing the relative inflation to an end. Such fixing proved effective in 
a number of other former members of the Soviet Union. Furthermore the fact that three of the coun-
tries have something close to fixed exchange rates anyway suggests that the extra step of monetary 
union may not be very drastic economically. Governments have already decided that fixity offers 
greater benefits than adjustment, although it should be recognised that in Russia, Kazakhstan and 
Ukraine the authorities have contained the upward pressures arising from external surpluses on the 
nominal exchange rate, which has made disinflation elusive. Monetary union should be a much 
more credible peg than present arrangements. 
 
The current account position (Figure 5) is also promising, as the Russian Federation and Kazakh-
stan are running substantial surpluses as a result of the strength of their raw material prices, and 
Ukraine and Belarus are close to balance. However, those latter balances would be ephemeral if the 
Russians were to charge full world prices for their oil and gas exports, and disputes with Ukraine 
and now Belarus over the last year or so suggest that this is an important bargaining counter that can 
be used in the inter-country bargaining. (Both countries are now on the way to having to pay for 
their Russian gas and oil imports at prices approaching the world level.) Not surprisingly given their 
size, the Russian Federation is much more important as a trade partner to the others than they are to 
it (Table 2). (Imports from the Russian Federation are 30% of the total in Ukraine, 45% in Kazakh-
stan and 60% in Belarus, whereas the reverse flows are only 5-8% of Russian imports, giving a total 
share of 20%, which is significant but not overwhelming.) Other bilateral shares did not exceed 5% 
in 2003. 
 
If we consider bilateral trade balances the position is different, but this is no longer relevant in the 
same way once the union has been formed. The accumulation of regional claims within the union is 
of no different concern than within a country, although, of course, without any federal regional pol-
icy this will be accounted for by private sector claims and national structural and fiscal policies. It is 
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the overall ability to maintain a largely unchanged exchange rate without undue strain that is the 
relevant criterion. Nevertheless one serious worry in the background must be that because of the 
1998 problems inter alia, the ruble appears to be undervalued (IMF, 2005a). This implies, that as 
time passes the base for all of the countries with respect to third currencies will tend to rise – this 
would be in addition to the general rise in the price level that can be expected as income per head 
rises relative to that in the more advanced countries.  
 
Nevertheless, such undervaluations (and overvaluations for that matter) can be very persistent and 
while the ruble is towards the edge of the distribution, other transition countries, such as the Czech 
Republic, are similarly below the average relationship (IMF, 2005a, Box 2).  This would imply that 
the region could suffer from the Dutch disease, although the extensive reinvestment of oil income in 
a fund, like that in Norway, helps reduce the pressure. The Russian oil price stabilisation fund, set 
up in 2004, will probably do the same and thereby go so way to stabilising the impact on the other 
countries. However, the IMF (2005b) also believes the hryvnia to be undervalued so the major 
question may relate to real exchange rate between the Russian federation and its partners. In the 
case of Kazakhstan, there appears to be little worry (IMF, 2006) as the tenge is in the view of the 
IMF even more undervalued and likely to continue to appreciate. Indeed the issue is whether there 
would be sufficient appreciation before any permanent fixing to the ruble. Any problems of over-
valuation are thus more likely in the future than in the present, unlike the case when countries, such 
as the UK, tried to rejoin the gold standard after the first world war. 
 
Figures 6 and 7 cover what have been the most contentious convergence criteria in the EU, namely, 
government debt and deficit ratios. Here again the position is relatively promising. The Russian de-
fault reorganised the basis for sustainable fiscal policy and with strong revenues as a result of the 
surge in oil and other raw materials prices, the economy has been seeing surpluses and a run down 
in debt. Total government debt is now approaching 10% of GDP, a small proportion of the EU 60% 
criterion, and the surplus in 2005 was approaching 8%. Since some of the revenue base is subject to 
substantial fluctuation, not expanding spending to meet the recent increases is prudent. Kazakhstan 
is in the same position with respect to the deficit (surplus) the government has accumulated even 
slightly less debt and external debt is falling rapidly. Belarus is also in a favourable government 
debt position, with a debt ratio of less than 10% and trivial external debt. While it has been running 
deficits, these are clearly within the EU guideline, and with a strong growth rate should be sustain-
able. The Ukrainian government debt, at well over 20%, and deficit ratios are also within the nor-
mal bounds, although their position is the weakest of the four countries. The IMF (2005a,b) has ex-
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so, the EU criterion is itself a decidedly arbitrary number based on the average position at the time 
and expected growth rates, and this may not be much of a concern. 
 
The four countries have a substantial industrial sector (Table 1). While Belarus and Ukraine have 
similar shares of manufacturing to most of their western European neighbours, both the Russian 
Federation and Kazakhstan have much stronger natural resource sectors. This becomes obvious if 
we consider exports (Figure 8). The dominance of oil in Kazakhstan is obvious, substantially ex-
ceeding even the high share in Russia, even if metals, metal products and precious stones are added 
in. It is also clear that metals feature strongly in the export structure of the Ukrainian economy, al-
though in the Ukrainian and also Belarusian case it is the importance of agriculture which distin-
guishes it from the other three countries. However, what seems surprising at first blush is the fairly 
strong showing of Belarus in oil products. The source of this is clear from Figure 9. Belarus has 
been importing oil and gas from the Russian Federation and exporting the products after refining – a 
reflection of the structure of its industry in the Soviet Union days. 
 
One aspect of the difference in the economies worth pointing out is the continuing dominance of the 
state in Belarus, with state banks dominating the financial system and state firms much of the pro-
ductive sector. The role of market mechanisms in adjustment has so far been and probably will still 
for some time to come be clearly small and hence ‘asymmetric’. 
 
If we move beyond trade, it is clear, Table 3, that mutual FDI by the Russian Federation and the en-
tire CIS is small compared to Russian FDI as a whole. However, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine 
are clearly the most important partners among the CIS in this regard (Table 4). Thus although the 
sums may be relatively small they do indicate the relative importance of the relationships. With the 
rise in oil price, foreign exchange reserves in the Russian Federation have raced away, rising from 
188$bn to 289$bn between January and November 2006 alone. Kazakhstan’s reserves have risen 
even faster, from 8.1 to 15.1$bn but this is an order magnitude smaller in absolute size. During the 




We thus see quite a wide range of disparities in economic structure among the four countries but 
nevertheless some clear convergence in terms of the EU’s Maastricht criteria for membership of 
EMU. However, this does not cover the issue of asymmetry in the shocks likely to hit the four coun-
                                                 
1 Ukrainian figures relate to 2005 (all from IMF). 
  7tries, which is a significant factor affecting the desirability  of a common monetary policy. We con-
sider this next. 
 
2  Benefits 
 
Chaplygin et al. (2006) provide a helpful analysis of how a monetary union among the Russian 
Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine might work out. They focus in a sophisticated manner 
on the nature of asymmetric shocks and responses that might be expected, which tends to be the key 
feature of modern assessments of the potential gains/costs from integration. However, they have a 
strong focus on what they see as costs ‘a currency union … is likely to be expensive in terms of in-
creased instability and lost performance.’ (p.64). They are concerned that the Russian Federation is 
likely to be a source of supply shocks and that because of its dominant position the other three 
countries will have to adjust. They argue (p.63) that for the costs of forming a monetary union to be 
small, the within group cyclical correlations must approach unity and the shocks must have roughly 
equal variances. They are very clearly far from this and hence the authors conclude that ‘the costs 
for each country will be at least one standard deviation larger than the adjustment costs which that 
country would have faced with floating exchange rates. A currency union will not come cheap.’ 
(p.64). 
 
However, there is little discussion of whether there are likely to be any compensating benefits or 
whether behaviour, including policy, would be different if the countries were to form a monetary 
union. Belarus, for example, is distinguished by monetary shocks in the past, a feature which would 
be likely to disappear in a monetary union. As is clear from the foregoing discussion, the structure 
of the four countries and their trade in particular is fairly different (‘asymmetric’ in the jargon of the 
literature) being largely dominated by inter rather than intra-industry trade. Kazakhstan is a supplier 
of inputs to the Russian Federation and the Russian Federation a supplier to Belarus, which gives an 
indication of the sequence of effect of supply shocks, while demand shocks are quite well correlated 
between the Russian Federation and Belarus (over 0.5 with a two quarter lag, according to Chaply-
gin et al. (2006)), giving a clear reflection of their close integration in a wide range of products. 
Chaplygin et al’s innovation in looking at the correlogram of shocks over a four year interval rather 
than simply the contemporaneous correlation is highly informative as it gives an indication of the 
sequence of events. 
 
What we see therefore is a group of structurally different countries, with more limited mutual trade 
than one might expect given their location and previous relationship. There is some capital mobility 
but, on the whole, limited labour mobility (although there have been some fairly substantial out-
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that the mechanisms for flexible wage and price adjustment by these countries, if they join a mone-
tary union, are limited. However, the future scope may be greater than they suggest. It is difficult to 
get reliable figures on the extent of migration among the four countries or indeed on migration from 
them to other countries, and the official figures that Chaplygin et al. use are likely to be a major un-
derstatement. Chaplygin et al. also note that there have been no fiscal transfers from one country to 
another to help offset any asymmetric shocks, although one might wish to argue that the pricing of 
oil and gas exports from the Russian Federation has represented an element of fiscal transfer and 
one that fluctuates in response to what would otherwise be energy shocks. However, this mecha-
nism is now rapidly disappearing as prices are being raised to market levels. 
 
One way of looking at the issue therefore would be to suggest that there could be substantial payoff 
from a closer union, with production patterns being turned towards a more efficient structure and 
competition being increased to heighten this improvement. Chaplygin et al. argue that hegemony 
means that rather the opposite is likely to occur. It would be difficult for the smaller states to de-
velop new industries that would be able to compete effectively with their Russian counterparts. Fur-
thermore, some of the major benefits that emerge for small countries, from lower interest rates may 
not be present if the hegemon itself does not enjoy these rates. To some extent a larger country gets 
a lower risk premium simply because it is large enough and diversified enough to absorb many of 
the shocks that hit economies. This is clearly the case for the Russian Federation with its consider-
able geographical spread, natural resource base and sheer economic size. In any case the importance 
of the Russian Federation in Belarus’s trade is already so large that the scope for net trade creation 
will be limited. 
 
Since the difficulties culminating in the 1998 crisis and default the economic stability and fiscal 
strength of the country has improved considerably and it is no longer the case that it offers a worse 
prospect to other countries, as it did earlier. Indeed, other than Kazakhstan, the other countries show 
typical signs of the weakness that all transition economies face, with revenue earning being a con-
sequence of economic success but the costs of transition being felt up front. Several of the new EU 
member states are still facing the same difficulties. As IMF (2005b) notes, Ukraine has been finding 
that exchange rate fixity with the US dollar has not been offering a satisfactory anchor for inflation. 
Although allowing the rate to appreciate and move more closely with the euro has helped, finding 
an effective substitute anchor is still to come as full inflation targeting is still something for the fu-
ture. 
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would act as a more credible restraint on fiscal excess than national forces. Unfortunately, the ex-
perience in the European Union gives only a limited signal in this regard. Behaviour in the conver-
gence period was much more sustainable than that in the years that preceded it. Although there has 
been some clear weakening in resolve compared to the Stability and Growth Pact, nevertheless per-
formance remains a great deal more prudent than that in the pre-convergence years (Mayes and 
Virén, 2007). Restraint is far less than that imposed within federations when often the lower levels 
of government are heavily restricted in the borrowing they can undertake and may have balanced 
budget requirements that are clearly enforceable. However, it is not clear that the net impact on the 
countries other than the Russian Federation would be negative in this regard. Nevertheless it is in-
herent in the term ‘hegemony’ that the Russian Federation could have strong bargaining power over 
its partners. The importance of the pricing of energy inputs has already been felt. With a strong role 
for the state and concentrated industry, the ability to use economic power as a negotiating device 
would be considerable. Hegemony is exercisable both inside and outside monetary union. 
 
It is thus possible that in addition to the typically small gains from reduced transactions costs, lower 
barriers, economies of scale and increased efficiency through competitiveness, the smaller states 
might gain considerably from importing the financial market benefits of the Russian economy’s di-
versification and strength, and further credibility from restraint on their ability to run up unsustain-
able debt. However, with the levels of efficiency estimated for Ukraine (IMF, 2005b) at two thirds 
of that in the Russian Federation and less than half that in neighbouring Hungary, the efficiency 
gains could also be large. There is bargaining power on both sides. Not only does Kazakhstan have 
considerable natural resources itself, which make it a desirable partner for others, but both Ukraine 
and Belarus have an alternative EU option as a partner, even though this is somewhat distant at pre-
sent. The Russian Federation sets considerable store by having its immediate neighbours in its 
sphere of influence. The costs it might pay by having them in a single market and a monetary union 
may well be thought small in comparison.  
 
All of these remarks are tentative and the opposite line of argument could be followed. Nevertheless 
there is clear scope for a change in behaviour that would result in the four countries moving increas-
ingly towards the conditions felt necessary for an optimum currency area. Gulde et al. (2004), look-
ing just at the possible monetary union between the Russian Federation and Belarus, come to a 
similar conclusion that the pressures entailed might result in Belarus making many of the changes 
necessary to have a more stable and sustainable range of economic policies. One of the problems 
with the credibility of any such moves (Odling-Smee, 2003) is that it is how investors view it that 
matters, not simply what the authorities chose to do or how they present it. There are many oppor-
  10tunities in the transitional period when union is not certain but Belarus is moving away from its pre-
sent regime for a loss in credibility to make finding a new anchor difficult (Schipke, 2002). Schnabl 
(2005) argues that if anything the four countries’ exchange rate regimes are diverging at present. 
Their weaknesses suggest that they need a joint external anchor. While until recently this might 
have been the US dollar, the movement towards the euro by the Russian Federation makes this 
more complicated. 
 
3  Costs 
 
The major problem for the countries is the unequal importance of the partners. It is by no means 
clear that a union would involve all countries at the same time, especially considering the fluctuat-
ing opinions in Ukraine where the President is currently clearly opposed. If we take therefore the 
most realistic possibility of the union between the Russian Federation and Belarus the major prob-
lem is to come up with a structure where both the relative size of the countries is acknowledged but 
the fact that they are both sovereign countries is also taken into account. Thus from the point of 
view of monetary policy it is clear that it should be aimed at the area as a whole in terms of its rela-
tive economic importance. Thus Belarus would be no more important in the total calculation than an 
oblast in the Russian Federation of equivalent size.
2 This does not mean that all regions in the 
monetary union should be given equal weight any more than it does in the EU (Mayes and Virén, 
2006). 
 
The responsiveness of ‘regions’ to changes in the setting of the instruments of monetary policy var-
ies across a monetary union as it is affected by industrial and economic institutions. Furthermore it 
appears that responsiveness varies nonlinearly according to where the region is in the business cy-
cle. When economies are growing rapidly (compared to trend) inflation is much more responsive to 
changes in economic pressure than when the economy is doing badly, when inflation is virtually 
invariant to fluctuations in the real economy. Hence, if parts of the whole economy are out of phase 
with each other in the business cycle this must be taken into account in setting policy, as simple 
arithmetic aggregation can be decidedly inaccurate for a nonlinear relationship. Nevertheless in a 
comparison of the behaviour of Belarusian and Russian Federation monetary policies Pelipas and 
Tochnitskaya (2006) find noticeable similarities, so this problem may turn out to have only limited 
importance.. 
 
                                                 
2 Indeed it could be a useful exercise to explore how existing Russian oblasts are affected by membership of the Federa-
tion and its single currency as an indicator of the potential position of Belarus. A similar analysis is undertaken by 
Coleman (2001), comparing the position of Queensland and New Zealand in an Australasian monetary union. 
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ion, the component regions should be treated in the same way whether they are parts of a single 
country or independent countries. Thus the specific needs of a small region will have little impact 
on the appropriate policy decision for the union as a whole. However, from a political perspective 
the balance of power in taking decisions over how policy is to be set needs to be a much closer re-
flection of the number of sovereign countries involved. Each country expects to have a say however 
small it is. Thus the Russian Federation could expect to be outvoted if there are several members or 
at least an agreement (consensus in the words of the Eurosystem) would be required if there are 
only two parties. Chaplygin (2006) provides a discussion of some of the issues affecting the deci-
sion. 
 
In practice both sides of this arrangement are difficult for members. Belarus would like a more 
equal consideration in the setting of policy while the Russian Federation would prefer to be able to 
decide all issues. This is a difficult relationship where is it is difficult to find precedents. If one 
country is a hegemon then it will tend to wish to exert hegemony (tautology ignored). For this not to 
be the case the larger partner needs to be clear that decision-making will be run on the basis of re-
spect for the rules and for its economic importance. 
 
The most obvious issue is stability, particularly financial stability. If the stability of the junior part-
ner is at stake will special measures be taken? For the junior partner to agree the answer has to be 
yes. For the senior partner to agree there has to be adequate restraint on the junior partner from tak-
ing risky decisions. While this will obviously include fiscal policy, it is not clear how far it will ex-
tend into structural policy and other factors affecting the stability of the economy. Kittlemann et al. 
(2006) suggest that there were alarm signals of financial instability in Russia in 2003 and 2004 (the 
end of their data period) but not in Ukraine after 2001, although complete regime shifts from stabil-
ity to crisis are possible within the course of single year according to their models. The Stability and 
Growth Pact plus the arrangements for coordination of policy in the EU are a good example. The 
ideas of open coordination and the cooperation of countries on employment and other topics show 
that union needs to be far more than the monetary if the monetary union is to work. This is difficult 
enough to achieve with equal partners. With a bilateral union of unequal partners it is a major re-
quirement for the hegemon to take such an altruistic approach – it needs to have a lot to gain to cede 
this much discretion. 
 
The considerations also extend to the safety of the banking system and the ‘lender’ of last resort 
function. The Belarus authorities have been keen to ensure that they would retain responsibility for 
handling their own banks. Given that the system is dominated by state banks and that there has been 
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thorities would wish to be able to continue and to handle any consequences that might emerge from 
the quality of lending. If a new central bank for the union were to adopt a more conventional lender 
of last resort role and only provide interim finance to apparently solvent institutions at above market 
rates, this would represent a clear change in policy and could run the risk of a wider financial crisis 
in Belarus. Treating the banking system as a whole would tend to encourage Russian banks to gain 
market share in a manner parallel to rise of foreign-owned banking in the smaller countries of the 
EU. While this would increase financial stability it could cause a problematic loss of sovereignty for 
Belarus. 
 
It is difficult to think of any voting or power sharing arrangements that would be viewed favourably 
by all parties under a strong hegemony. The ideas of implementing voting systems for monetary 
policy where double majorities apply, which is the easiest way to protect both the large and the 
small, does not work sensibly for this group. In a double majority system, for a measure to be 
passed it must not simply be the wish of the majority of the states involved but also of a majority of 
the population. In heavily unequal union, as envisaged here, this may simply convey a blocking ma-
jority for the largest country. Thus the majority of states argument only works as a block in the op-
posite direction, preventing the major country from having its way when none of the others agree 
with it. This could be a recipe for a serious stalemate. Even if major decisions, such as design of the 
currency can be postponed when the parties disagree, being unable to agree on what to do with re-
gard to monetary policy is not a viable option. The pace of decision making in the Eurosystem, 
where consensus is the form of majoritarian rule selected, has not on the whole showed signs of 
causing undue delay, so problems can be overcome. See Mayes (2004) for an exposition of how an 
unequal monetary union could be implemented. 
 
The problem comes with systematic asymmetries of need in the timing of policy, as set out in 
Chalpygin et al. (2006) for the four CIS countries in the study. If one country systematically lags 
another in its response to shocks, policy aimed largely at the leading country could diminish the op-
portunities of the follower. However, such an impact would tend to alter the cyclical behaviour of 
the following country in anticipation of this outcome, thereby making the cycles more correlated 
after the event. In Crowley et al. (2006) we show that there has been considerable increasing corre-
lation of business cycles among the main EU countries and also increasing correlation at a much 
wider range of frequencies. However, clear differences remain at shorter frequencies similar to that 
over which monetary policy has its main effect 
 
4  Choice 
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The rather more active discussion between Belarus and the Russian Federation illustrates the diffi-
culties (Gulde et al., 2004). The Central Bank of the Russian Federation (CBR) would like to see a 
centralised set up where it sets the conditions (including a minority of Belarusian members on the 
decision making body and the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (NBRB) implemented the 
policy in Belarus. The NBRB on the other hand sees co-ordinated monetary policy by the two cen-
tral banks with equal representation on the decision making body (but a Russian Chairman to re-
solve disagreement). Monetary actions would be in proportion to GDP and undertaken by the two 
central banks in their own territories on an equal footing. (The Belarus-Russian Federation union is 
planned to take place in two steps. In the first instance, the Russian rouble is introduced in Belarus 
and Belarusian rubel withdrawn. Then the new joint currency would be issued, replacing the ruble. 
There must be some concern that only the first step will be completed. Clearly there are problems in 
how the NBRB receives its share of the seignorage in a system where the gains are routed through 
the CBR.) 
 
The extent of the difficulty is revealed in President Lukashenko’s reported remarks (Pravda, 2003) 
‘The introduction of a single currency … effectively means a political union with Russia as well. … 
Moreover, if we accept a foreign currency, no matter how the agreement is worded, we will basi-
cally assume the role of a puppet state. As the President of this country I am afraid of taking this 
step and will do everything I can to avoid it. As a result we are now holding difficult talks with 
Russia.’ In other words he did not believe that a relationship would have much in the way of equal-
ity to it in practice. The Russian Federation itself has varied the message, with President Putin ‘sur-
prising’ Belarus in 2002 by suggesting a speeding up in the implementation of monetary union by a 
year under a scheme where either the seven Belarusian oblasts were incorporated into the Russian 
Federation or there was a form of subsidiarity for Belarus along the lines of that in the EU (Richard-
son, 2003). 
 
Thus although there may be problems with the fiscal sustainability of the Russian Federation, Gulde 
et al., argue that if Belarus were to move to a similar standard that would be a substantial improve-
ment. Belarus has all the disadvantages of a small market and monetary union would at least give it 
proper access to international financial markets. 
 
It seems from the controversy generated by the discussions over the Single Economic Space in 
Ukraine that feelings have been even stronger (Sushko, 2004). There clear political divisions in the 
country and even though the Supreme Rada clearly approved the principle in the time of President 
  14Kuchma in 2003, even he had described monetary union as a ‘mythical project’.
3 However, one 
might liken it to some of the ideas in the launch of the EEC with the Treaty of Rome on 1956. Many 
of the objectives would have been widely regarded as very intangible and not likely to be achieved 
within any planning horizon, even though 50 years on they are a reality. As Sushko suggests the 
other three countries primarily regard the arrangement as a means of getting good access to the 
large Russian market, whereas there are many in the Russian Federation who see it less as an eco-
nomic arrangement but more as reinforcing a sphere of influence. Anatoly Chubais (2003) talked of 
a ‘liberal empire’ saying that the SES ‘will be a direct step towards the establishment of the em-
pire’.
4 Apparently even moving as far as a customs union from the idea of a free trade area was a 
step too far for the Vice-Premier at the time Mykola Azarov (p.127).
5
 
A clearer idea of where the balance of power is going to lie in the SES can be found in Article IV of 
the Treaty, relating to the single regulatory body, whose decisions will be binding on all of the par-
ties. ‘The decisions of the regulatory body will be taken by weighted vote. The number of votes of 
each party is to determined taking into account its economic potential’
6 As George von Furstenburg 
forcefully pointed out to us in his comments on the original draft, it is inherent in the concept of he-
gemony that the hegemon exploits its position to its own rather than the joint benefit. The hegem-
ony exists up to the point that the other countries can get away. 
 
The CIS countries do have a third choice; they could move towards dollarisation or indeed euroisa-
tion. The seignorage consequences would be the same as rubleisation but the peg would be to a 
more reliable currency. Since the Russian Federation is itself tracking a euro/dollar basket, this 
would effectively cut out the middle step. Indeed, insofar as it is permitted, depositors have already 
shown a preference for dollar and euro assets over the domestic currency. To quite an extent dol-
larisation is determined by the market rather than by the authorities. For a country whose major ex-
ports or imports are priced in dollars, dollarisation could offer some greater stability.  
 
In the longer run the euro could be a direction for both Ukraine and Belarus. While the EU has been 
very hostile to the current regime in Belarus, to the extent of imposing sanctions, President Luka-
shenko has been at pains to point out during the recent crisis with Russia (26 and 30 January, 
2007)
7 that the EU and the euro are an option that could be pursued. While that is no doubt a nego-
tiating tactic, it has force because it is technically possible, although not under the present regime. 
                                                 
3 Sushko (2004) cites this as available at http://rus.for-ua.com/news/2003/03/26/152310.html. 
4 The Russia Journal Daily: Politics, September 26, 2003. 
5 See also http://rus.for-ua.com/news/2003/124125.html. 
6 Taken from Sushko’s (2004) translation of www.obozrevatel.com/?r=subject&t=107&id=96877&p=5. 
7 BELTA news agency 
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It is very easy to agree with the conclusion in Gulde et al. (2004, p.29) ‘The long-run net economic 
effect[s] of a proposed currency union between Belarus and Russia is not clear.’ Odling-Smee 
(2003, p.1) puts it ‘… on economic grounds alone – it is not really possible to say whether Belarus 
will benefit from monetary union.’ Indeed that remark could be applied to a lot of monetary unions, 
since the outcome depends on how the members choose to react both in terms of public policy and 
in the private sector. It represents a regime change. The ingredients for success and failure, loss and 
gain are all present. All one can readily do is list them and perhaps assign some tentative probabili-
ties. However, the authors go further and suggest that either Belarus effectively has to ‘rubleise’ and 
adjust itself to the monetary policy of the Russian Federation or that the Russian Federation has to 
view the process of integration as something more comprehensive and be prepared to assist in the 
development of Belarus, including the use of fiscal transfers to offset some of the costs of change in 
a more federal approach. ‘Anything in the middle is bound to fail.’ 
 
We can extend this analysis to a monetary union including Kazakhstan and Ukraine as well. Be-
cause the Russian Federation is so much larger than the other economies combined, it will effec-
tively choose how the system is to be run. In any case with the energy links between the Russian 
Federation and Belarus and Ukraine there is already an important element of economic hegemony. 
Even Kazakhstan with its own resources is somewhat limited in the policies it can apply because of 
its location with a long border with the Russian Federation. It is easy to recall the caution of Finland 
in the period of the Soviet Union, even though in geographic terms Finland is completely open to 
the west. However, such caution did not apply to monetary policy, which had been independent 
right from the time that Sweden ceded Finland to Russia in 1806. While the ruble was legal tender 
in Finland, people tried to avoid using it because it was a weaker currency. This judgement can no 
longer be made with respect to the group of countries we are considering here. The Russian Federa-
tion could be a source of strength, cutting the cost of finance through reducing the risk premium and 
providing greater economic stability through a more diversified economy.  
 
Gulde et al. (2004) argue that joining the monetary union and the knowledge that it is going to hap-
pen could act as shock therapy to ensure that the necessary changes are made in the constituent 
member states to enable them to compete. This argument was advanced in the case of Finnish 
membership of the euro area (see Pekkarinen et al.(1997) for the government sponsored report) and 
appears to have been the case in subsequent behaviour (Mayes and Suvanto, 2002). However, this 
view is not universally shared ex ante. Sweden, which in many respects was likely to be a better 
case for euro zone membership in terms of the OCA criteria laid out in Section 2, came to the oppo-
  16site conclusion in its report on the likely costs and benefits (Calmfors et al., 1996). They argued that 
there was a danger that Sweden would not only get locked in to its then high rate of unemployment 
but that the process of integration might make it worse. Hence adjustment should occur first and 
membership second. It is also worth noting that such perfectly sensible economic reasons for timing 
get readily wrapped up in the political decision making (Mayes and Suvanto, 2006). Monetary un-
ion for Sweden is now well over the political horizon after membership was rejected in a referen-
dum in 2004, despite the fact that the economic concerns had by then been answered. Much of what 
is required for monetary union is political will and no doubt this will be the main characterisation of 
the decision over any monetary union among the four CIS countries considered here. 
 
For the Russian Federation there is a decision to be made about the relative economic costs and 
benefits of having the three partners go in a different direction compared to the level of support that 
may prove necessary to hold the union together in the face of economic and political shocks. The 
straight economic gain from a larger market reduced transaction costs and possibly competition 
would probably be small by comparison. The choice for the other three is more difficult. They have 
to make judgements about the long-run economic and foreign policy of the Russian Federation. 
How favourable will policy, directed to the benefit of the Russian Federation and at worst (best?) 
neutral with respect to the partner countries, be compared to one that treats them as independent 
countries, especially if they choose alliances with other groupings? 
 
Currently policy is mainly one of a close relationship with the ruble, limiting fluctuations rather 
than a hard fix. It is reminiscent of the position of the EU countries in their earlier steps towards 
monetary union. The subsequent developments might also follow the same pattern, with some ebb 
and flow, but ultimately with some choosing union and some not. While economics may be the line 
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  19Figure 1  Convergence of GDP 
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Figure 3  Inflation 















  20Figure 4  Exchange Rate Movements 
















Figure 5  The Current Account 
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Figure 6  Debt 
 
External debt at end-year, % of GDP
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  21Figure 7  The government deficit (surplus) ratio 
 

















Table 1  Economic Structure 
 
 
      GDP structure in 2004 
 
 
  Russia  Belarus  Ukraine Kazakhstan 
 
  %  share 
 
Agriculture        5.4      9.5    10.8      7.0 
 
Industry      27.2    26.8    28.3    29.4 
 
-  mining and quarrying      8.5        3.6    13.6 
 
-  manufacturing     15.6      18.6    13.3 
 
 







  22Figure 8  The Natural resource Base 
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Sources: National statistical and customs offices, IMF
 Kazakhstan - oil
 Russia - oil, oil products, gas
 Ukraine - metals
 Belarus - oil products
 Russia - metals, metal products, precious stones
 
 
Figure 9  Energy Dependency 
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Sources: National statistical and customs offices, IMF
 Belarus - oil, gas
 Ukraine - fuels, oil products
 
  23Figure 10  Mutual Trade 
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Table 2  Bilateral Trade as a Percentage of Total Trade (2003) 
 
                                                                                         Exporter 
Importer  Belarus Kazakhstan  Russian  Fed  Ukraine 
Belarus -  <  5  59  5 
Kazakhstan  < 5  -  45  < 5 
Russian Fed  8  5  -  7 
Ukraine 2  <  2  28  - 
 
Source: Chaplygin et al. (2006) 
 
Table 3  FDI Flows of the Russian Federation 
  
 TOTAL FDI.  1997 г.  1998 г. 1999 г. 2000 г. 2001 г. 2002 г. 2003 г.  2004 г.  2005 г. 1Q06 
      From Russia  -3 184  -1 270 -2 208 -3 177 -2 533 -3 533 -9 727  -13 782  -12 393 -5 006
      To Russia  4 865  2 761 3 309 2 714 2 748 3 461 7 958  15 444  14 183 6 503
           NON-CIS: 
      From Russia  -2 784  -1 142 -1 690 -2 898 -2 035 -3 259 -9 033  -12 837  -11 473 -4 408
      To Russia  4 854  2 754 3 304 2 708 2 746 3 657 7 913  15 409  14 104 6 503
            CIS: 
      From Russia  -400  -128 -518 -278 -498 -274 -694  -945  -920 -598
      To Russia  11  7 6 6 3 -196 46  36  79 0
 Source: Vestnik Bank 
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Total  130981  100 544141 100 713016 100 620522 100
      of which in the 
      economy of:                         
Azerbaijan 26  0.0  1613 0.3 2379 0.3 6734 1.1 
Armenia 5  0.0  7650 1.4 1032 0.2 138185 22.3 
Belarus 77238  59.0  243355 44.7 280193 39.3 102438 16.5 
Georgia 133  0.1  1182 0.2 285 0.0 60 0.0 
Kazakhstan 3453  2.6  27135 5.0 84104 11.8 204314 32.9 
Kyrgyzstan 7  0.0  608 0.1 628 0.1 1247 0.2 
Moldova 31224  23.8  372 0.1 6600 0.9 4904 0.8 
Tadjikistan -  -  18 0.0 3067 0.4 496 0.1 
Turkmenistan 2934  2.3  857 0.2 1865 0.3 - - 
Uzbekistan 929  0.7  582 0.1 138547 19.4 6968 1.1 
Ukraine 15032  11.5  260769 47.9 194316 27.3 155176 25.0 
Table 4b Investments of the CIS Countries in the Economy of Russia (Incl. Loans) 

























Total investments  22375  100 889617 100 1097148 100 1665257 100 
      of which from 
       countries:                         
Azerbaijan 831  3.7  6234 0.7 8962 0.8 54983 3.3 
Armenia 5  0.0  131 0.0 367 0.0 4541 0.3 
Belarus 1007  4.5  419803 47.2 292215 26.6 447135 26.9 
Georgia 207  0.9  4147 0.5 11265 1.0 7902 0.5 
Kazakhstan 5632  25.2  195473 22.0 438977 40.0 732788 44.0 
Kyrgyzstan 839  3.8  31117 3.5 65590 6.0 140168 8.4 
Moldova 1069  4.8  124 0.0 3051 0.3 18100 1.1 
Tadjikistan 27  0.1  307 0.0 2294 0.2 13843 0.8 
Turkmenistan 1024  4.6  4066 0.4 2125 0.2 2288 0.1 
Uzbekistan 2738  12.2  88780 10.0 131500 12.0 10639 0.6 
Ukraine 8996  40.2  139435 15.7 140802 12.9 232870 14.0 
  
Source: Rosstat. 
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